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ABSTRACT 
 
How do we assign value to economic transactions? To answer this question, we must 
consider whether the value of objects is inherent, is a product of social interaction, or involves 
other mechanisms. Economic theory predicts that there is an optimal price for any market 
transaction, and can be observed during auctions or other bidding processes. However, there are 
also social, cultural, and cognitive components to the assignation of value, which can be 
observed in both human and non-human Primate societies. While behaviors related to these 
factors are embedded in market interactions, they also involve a biological substrate for the 
assignation of value (valuation). To synthesize this diversity of perspectives, we will propose 
that the process of valuation can be modeled computationally and conceived of as a set of 
interrelated cultural evolutionary, cognitive, and neural processes. To do this, contextual 
geometric structures (CGS) will be placed in an agent-based context (minimal and compositional 
markets). Objects in the form of computational propositions can be acquired and exchanged, 
which will determine the value of both singletons and linked propositions. Expected results of 
this model will be evaluated in terms of their contribution to understanding human economic 
phenomena. The paper will focus on computational representations and how they correspond to 
real-world concepts. The implications for evolutionary economics and our contemporary 
understanding of valuation and market dynamics will also be discussed. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 What is your alien artifact worth? This seemingly strange question has a less ambiguous 
motivation centered upon how the economic value of objects and ideas gets determined. Are 
there a set of intrinsic properties and mechanisms that determine value, or is valuation purely a 
product of human interactions and cultural construction? And if the answer lies between these 
two viewpoints, then how can it be represented? To better understand this, a somewhat false 
dichotomy will be introduced. This will motivate an evolutionary approach that bridges both of 
these perspectives. 
 
Origins of Economic Value 
 To computationally model the origins of economic value, we must understand valuation 
at the levels of markets, behavior, and neural mechanism. On one hand, we have the efficient 
markets hypothesis (EMH). In the "strong" formulation of EMH, prices fluctuate according to a 
random walk, and thus cannot directly predict value [1]. Yet information about prices (and 
ultimately value) is contained in the market’s structure, particularly when the market is in an 
equilibrium state. Other formulations of the EMH (e.g. "weak" EMH) suggest that there are 
fundamental valuation metrics that may allow for partial prediction with respect to market prices 
[2]. Alternately, we have the idea that valuation is a product of cultural construction and 
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interactivity. From a cross-cultural and historical perspective [3], it is apparent that value is a 
relative property that is dependent on systems of beliefs and morality [4, 5]. Contrary to the 
EMH, behavioral and cognitive factors play a more prominent role in determining how 
individuals interact with markets. Rather than discovering value from the intrinsic properties of a 
market’s collective dynamics, the interaction of thinking agents and the multitude of meanings 
(polysemy) each agent attaches to an object generates a unique valuation scheme with respect to 
context. 
 
 Aside from this argument, biological and cross-species comparisons reveal that valuation 
seems to be both a universal feature of all human societies and a conserved feature of primates. 
A meta-analysis [6] suggests that grooming and agonistic support may have evolved as part of a 
low-cost reciprocal altruism system. While this serves as a risk-management mechanism and 
buffer against the negative effects of competition [7], reciprocal grooming may also function as a 
de facto currency of exchange. Likewise, the human brain network for valuation has two 
components. These subnetworks govern the evaluation of stimuli and events in the world and the 
ability to make judgements on these observations, respectively. The risk and reward subnetwork 
involves projections from dopaminergic neurons in the brainstem (e.g. substantia nigra) to the 
ventral striatum (e.g. nucleus accumbens). The value assignment subnetwork involves mediating 
projections from the brainstem to the prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex. This has been related to 
behavior by [9], who demonstrate that introducing performance-based rewards on tasks reduces 
performance and shows a decrease in dopamine and brain activity associated with reward 
processing. These brain centers and signals provide a neural architecture for higher-level 
cognitive processes such as decision-making and natural classification. 
 
An Alternative Approach and Synthesis 
 To better understand the evolutionary emergence and nature of economic value, the 
concept of cultural markets will be introduced. Cultural markets have the potential to resolve 
theoretical tensions between proponents of self-regulating markets and the cultural construction 
of economic value (see Figure 1). In terms of structure, cultural markets are similar to the 
concept of biological markets [10] in that interactions between individuals are contingent upon 
both diversity and evolution. Implicitly, the neural substrate of Primate valuation is assumed to 
drive interactions between individuals. Explicitly, cultural context and market interactions are an 
important driving force behind the relative value of objects and exchanges. 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation showing the competing ideas of self-regulating markets and 
cultural construction of value without markets. 
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Value as Interactive Cultural Behavior 
 We can use an agent-based approach which enables cultural (e.g. culturally-specific) 
behaviors to model cultural markets and the evolution of value. Contextual Geometric Structures 
(CGSs) can be used to represent the relationship between objects of the same type, or different 
object types. CGS kernels are soft classifiers introduced in [11] that capture cultural behavior 
with respect to cognition, neural processing, and collective behavior. This model bridges the 
implicit and explicit aspect of valuation by modeling the neural substrate as a set of conditioned 
perceptual classifiers that incorporate an artificial genome.  
 
 The assumed connection between fluctuating information, perceptual classification, and a 
basis for value requires the incorporation of new information. The architecture of a scaled CGS 
kernel is shown in Figure 2. As with the standard CGS approach [11], the n-tuple representation 
embedded in an n-dimensional space. These dimensions are derived from relevant sensory 
processing and cultural bases. Using the CGS soft classifier is useful for representing the effects 
of culturally-mediated conceptual blending on perceptual classification and ultimately the 
assignation of value. This allows for diversity of valuation criteria across populations, in addition 
to an adaptive and abdutive decision-making framework. Yet the Primate neural substrate 
demonstrates that valuation does not rely solely upon a single act of natural classification. 
Rather, a complete assessment of value involves many centers which include classification, 
decision-making, and references to attention and memory. Two advances to the conventional 
CGS approach involve kernel scaling and the addition of a genotypic representation. Kernel 
scaling is necessary for the incorporation of novel, previously unobserved information. A tuning 
parameter (α) governs the extension of the kernel along each dimension. The genotypic 
representation consists of three sets of genes: genes that define the dimensions and anchors, 
genes involved in the cryptographic hash, and genes that define an agent’s inherent mental 
flexibility. This type of representation is potentially more compact than a very large 
connectionist network, but retains the generative capacity of such networks. More details on the 
scaled kernel design can be found in Methods, Section 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a scaled kernel, adjusted by a given kernel’s response to new information. 
INSET: 1) genes that define the dimensions and anchors, 2) genes involved in the cryptographic 
hash, 3) genes that define an agent’s inherent mental flexibility. 
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Transactional Representations 
 This approach requires additional representations that define a medium of exchange and a 
transaction space. Our medium of exchange involves the use of a currency. As a cross-cultural 
phenomenon, currencies provide a means to standardize value across transactions, and serve as a 
placeholder for economic transactions. While the form of currency varies across social context 
(e.g. paper money, shells, houses, bits), its function as a placeholder is generally the same. We 
can use a placeholder similar to digital crypto-currencies for purposes of assigning value to 
transactions in parallel. Besides allowing us to quantify economic transactions, the crypto-
currency approach [12] allows us to assign a unique identifier to each transaction. The Bitcoin 
model uses a cryptographic hash function [13] to enable secure transactions. We can use a 
similar mechanism (Methods, Section 2) to distinguish bidding behavior from complete 
transactions. 
 
 The concept of biological markets [14] can be used to define a transaction space for a 
population of agents. Scarcity is used as a criterion to assess the need for exchange, make 
selective transactions, and to minimize cheating. However, information concerning the objects 
and their relative worth also plays a role. Let us consider how the brain produces a judgment of 
value. When a transaction is made, an object is offered by the seller at a given price. That initial 
price is either accepted or rejected by the buyer. This leaves the flexibility of value for a given 
object open to one’s perceptual classification of the natural world. The synthetic biological 
markets introduced here are represented by a dual mechanism: the minimal market and the 
prediction (or compositional) market. To understand the role of each mechanism, it is important 
to point out that CGSs enable non-transitive relationships between all possible combinations of 
agents and placeholders, agents and objects, and placeholders and agents. Figures 3 and 4 
demonstrate how these transactions are structured. Figure 3 illustrates how the cryptographic 
hash concept can be applied to determining economic value. In a cryptographic hash, a 
transaction between agents consists of two parts: an object and a hash function. In Figure 4, the 
object is presented to the agent. However, the agent can only purchase the object if the 
placeholder allows them to. In this case, the placeholder is a hash function based on an internal 
threshold based on consistency with their CGS classification (see Methods, Section 3 for more 
information). 
  
Types of Markets 
 The first mechanism used to approximate the market for objects utilizes the minimal 
market approach (Figure 4A) to model pairwise exchanges of single propositions between 
agents. When embedded in a minimal market, agent-agent interactions create a generative search 
space, in which outcomes that have not been predetermined can be explored. In this way, there is 
no direct correspondence between fluctuations in the value of placeholders (e.g. money) versus 
the value of objects. However, there is a more general conceptual relationship that is established 
between objects and the placeholder. This allows for agents to “print money” and generate wild 
speculation as required by context. The second mechanism, used to approximate the market for 
placeholder value, utilizes the compositional market approach (Figure 4B) to model top-down 
mediated auctions that set value for linked propositions. Compositional markets (as opposed to 
minimal markets) involve large-scale (one-to-all) transactions. In Hanson [15] and Dudik et.al 
[16], such markets are centralized sources for predicting the value of a certain set of political 
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scenarios. This allows agents to collectively set the relative value of objects, which ultimately 
scales up to a coherent economic system. 
 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between an agent (buyer or seller), a placeholder (currency), and a type of 
object. 
 
 Agents can also be networked so that information can be exchanged between them. When 
agents are actively engaged in transactional behavior, an arc is established. In previous version of 
the CGS model, agents were allowed to move around the field in a manner determined by the 
environment. In this version, an agent’s mobility is determined by its previous interactions. 
Clustered agents represent those with a common initial classificatory scheme. However, with the 
addition of kernel scaling, nearby agents can be disconnected. In a like manner, initially 
dissimilar agents (e.g. those in a different cluster) can be connected, producing heterogeneous 
markets. 
 
Predicted Results  
 
Value Fluctuation 
 In cases where either a single proposition or linked set of propositions is hard to classify, 
the result is a high degree of fluctuation in value. This result will typically be undergirded by 
objects that are popular but not well understood in terms of their composition or phenomenology. 
Examples of this from the real world may include pricing bubbles, new technology hype, and 
even the value of popular entertainers and political figures. We can analytically demonstrate how 
these fluctuations might emerge using exemplars embedded in the compositional and minimal 
market configurations. These examples will elucidate how value can fluctuate across individuals 
making purchases from single sources as well as between individual agents. This will hopefully 
suggest ways in which the concept of value fluctuations (as opposed to de novo value 
construction) is multidimensional. 
 
 In compositional markets, a series of proposition become functionally linked together. 
This series includes a full set (e.g. A-B-C) in addition to singletons that form a transitive 
relationship (e.g. A, B, and C). A fluctuation in this experiment will be revealed by large 
differences in the value of the full set (A-B-C) relative to all subsets. A secondary criterion for 
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fluctuation can be revealed if value is divergent from the rules of logical transitivity. For 
example, if B is worth more than A, and C is worth than B, then A will be worth more than C. 
When these propositions are functionally linked together, some non-transitivity will necessarily 
result, as the gain in value for each combination is not always linear. However, it is when there is 
a large (e.g. many-fold) gain or loss that a fluctuation in value occurs.  
 
 
Figure 4. Example of synthetic market structure as represented by two components: minimal (A) 
and compositional (B) markets. See Methods, Section 3 for notational definitions. 
 
 We can also show that in minimal markets (Figure 6), the highly asymmetric exchange of 
singletons and subsets of A-B-C also provide a window into possible fluctuations in value due to 
conceptual (e.g. cultural) differences. This is particularly likely when the pairwise exchange is 
made between agents with different CGS schemes. For example, if the item being exchanged is 
something the buyer has prior experience with, then the value is likely to be similar to the object 
mean [17]. A different situation holds true for "missing piece" singletons, which can be applied 
to an agent's complement of propositions to hold something of much greater value than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 
Large-scale Gains and Losses in Value 
 Given the run-ups in value (sometimes called bubbles) in real-world markets ranging 
from tulip bulbs to housing, we can model these run-ups not as anomalous events, but as 
fundamental features of a market. The origin of such run-ups can be reduced to pairwise 
transactions shown in Figures 7 and 8. When replicated across the network topology, such run-
ups can result in bona-fide bubbles. Figure 7 outlines the pairwise underpinnings of these types 
of transactions, while Figure 8 demonstrates how gains in value can cascade across a network of 
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agents over the course of 3-5 transactions. Once a transaction is established between agent A and 
agent B, directionality is established which sends a signal of net gains (and net losses) to the rest 
of the network for this particular transaction. In this example, agent A makes a transaction with 
agent B. In the process, agent A sees a net gain of 20% (in arbitrary units). While this might be 
an extremely local (e.g. in the context of agent A and agent B) phenomenon, it can nonetheless 
be copied by other transacting agents.  
 
 
Figure 5. An example of connectivity between agents at single points in time. A: connections 
between agents that are currently engaged in a transaction (black arcs). B: connections between 
agents that are currently engaged in a transaction (black arcs) and transactions between agents 
with a common scaling factor (red arcs). 
 
 By using imitation rather than cultural and neural classification as a decision-making 
heuristic, a cascade of asymmetrical transactions can result. Methods, Section 4 provides more 
information as to how this imitation mechanism works in the model. More details about the 
observation criterion in the service of a selection function can be found in Methods, Section 5.  
One thing that stands out in Figure 8 is that a valuation bubble can be sustained through 
feedbacks. This behavior resembles an overloaded power grid, in which runaway feedbacks 
contribute to catastrophic failure. In this case, if an asymmetrical exchange takes place 
somewhere in the network, first-order connections can observe and replicate this without using a 
formal criterion. This is consistent with the multiple mechanisms for valuation in the brain. 
 
 
Value Inequality and Social Evolution 
 Now we turn from the emergence of valuation at the individual scale to interactions at the 
societal scale. This involves not only pairwise interactions in a network, but also first-order 
observations (or observations of direct connections in a network). This first-order observational 
capacity serves as a bridge between the pairwise and compositional market configurations. This 
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bridge is an essential feature of a valuation model, particularly for capturing herding and other 
mob-like group behaviors. In general, herding and other group behaviors provide a mechanism 
for understanding valuation bubbles. 
 
 
Figure 6. The concept of a minimal market, using a pairwise example (A, B). TOP: symmetrical 
trading between two specialist agents. BOTTOM: asymmetrical trading between two generalist 
agents. 
 
Demonstrating how this model can be applied to networked microeconomic scenarios allows us 
to move towards a type of meso-economics. Instead of generating theoretical models that assume 
equilibrium, the quasi-evolutionary approach taken here provides a series of plausible scenarios 
for social evolution. It is the social and cognitive plausibility of economic interactions with 
respect to valuation that can potentially address the inconsistencies of existing perspectives. 
 
 As a representation of the parallel economic transactions that underlie social evolution, 
this model presented may also capture both neurocognitive and social aspects of valuation over 
time. It is the economic evolutionary capacity which is potentially the most promising aspect of 
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this approach. This model allows us to capture both uncertainty in markets and generating a 
range of economic behaviors. In addition, the configuration of this model is meant to capture 
observed cultural co-evolution between market dynamics and social cognitive capacity.  
 
 
Figure 7. Summary of network approach using a pairwise (A, B) example. UPPER LEFT: A 
transaction is established between A and B. LOWER LEFT: definition of net losses and gains. 
RIGHT: example of net gain (20%) or agent A during a transaction. 
 
EMH-like vs. Polysemy 
 While this is not a predictive model, we can nonetheless use our potential measures to 
determine whether or not the values generated for an object were done so based on a random 
(efficient markets) mechanism or a polysemic (culturally-specific) mechanism. Figure 9 shows a 
hypothetical bivariate relationship where the range of acceptable values (Yik) predicts the soft 
classification value (Ax). In this case, a 2-tuple CGS would be the dependent variable (y-axis). 
However, for more complex CGSs, multiple dependent variables could be used. In these cases, 
the nature of value can be characterized in a multi-dimensional space.  
 
 In the bivariate case (Figure 9), there are three regimes: strong polysemy, weak 
polysemy, and EMH-like. They are defined not only by their extent in bivariate space, but their 
spread along each axis. For example, when the data show significant variance along the x-axis, 
the process is randomly walking in value space, which is indicative of an EMH-like valuation 
process. By contrast, when the data show significant variance along the y-axis, the process is 
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randomly walking in meaning space, which is indicative of a polysemic valuation process. 
Strong and weak polysemy can then be defined as the orientation of outliers along each axis. For 
strong polysemy, there is fewer outliers along the x-axis than along the y-axis, while in cases of 
weak polysemy, the opposite result is expected to hold. 
 
 
Figure 8. A series of transactions on a seven-node network. Universal gains in value for pairwise 
transactions reveal an emerging bubble. 
 
Conclusions 
 While the idea of an economic bubble is hard-to-define, this work can contribute to a 
more rigorous definition. While bubbles are generally thought of as rises in asset prices relative 
to value, they might be predicted by detecting deviations from fundamental value [18]. As to 
defining exactly what goes into determining fundamental value, this work can contribute to 
understanding what information, cognitive biases, and social relationships go into the valuation 
of objects and transactions. By employing the CGS approach, we can provide a link between bio-
inspired models such as neural modeling fields [19], quasi-folk classification systems, and 
conventional models of trading and economic exchange. 
 
 This approach is consistent with cognitive neuroscientific [20] and agent-based [21] 
models of valuation and evolutionary economics. At the individual level, there are multiple 
mechanisms involved in valuation [22]. At both the individual and population levels, uncertainty 
also plays a role in valuation [23]. This is particularly true of large fluctuations and degrees of 
variation in value. Yet whether these values come from the market itself or from cultural context 
can be tested experimentally. For example, when value converges across groups with a diversity 
of kernel compositions, then this is strong evidence that value comes from the market itself. By 
contrast, when value is highly divergent between groups, then this is strong evidence that value 
comes from cultural context. One outcome yet to be shown is that market success based on 
popularity or immediate payoff (e.g. the traditional supply-and-demand model) is a suboptimal 
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outcome. Such success is based on an inherent overvaluation due to the lack of searching the 
market space for a global equilibrium. 
 
 
Figure 9. Expected bivariate relationship demonstrating how the range of acceptable values 
should be related to the soft classifier values. This graph is also a representation of value space 
(Yik) vs. meaning space (Ax). 
 
 One advantage of this approach is the flexibility to model not only tangible goods and 
financial forms of capital, but social and political capital as well. In these cases, the objects are 
eliminated and the object of valuation using the placeholder functions becomes the mental 
representation of the agent itself. In a typical economic model, non-tangible forms of exchange 
and valuation would be a nonsensical set of arguments. Non-tangible ideas can be better valued 
using a model such as the one described in this paper. 
 
 Another future direction for this work involves distinguishing between markets rich in 
information and markets which are information-poor. Recall that conventional EMH theory 
predicts that all information is contained in the market. However, the twin dicta “the wisdom of 
crowds, the madness of crowds” suggests that as collective behavioral structures, economic 
markets can be both. 
 
Methods 
 
Section 1: formal definition of a market 
 The notation for Figure 3 is as follows. In A, pairwise exchanges between agents M, N 
take place in a minimal market. An interaction is either made to the same agent over time (e.g. 
Mi,Mj), or between agents over time (e.g. Ni,Mj). Two semi-independent exchanges are made: 
objects (i) and value (j). In B, an operator (r) functionally links sets of propositions together (Xi) 
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into a linked ensemble (q) and offers them at a pre-determined price (Xj). The offer is evaluated 
by traders (agents in the market) who decide to accept the offer based on a decision-making 
criterion (Yik). Yik is defined as 
 
      
                          
       
  
 
[1] 
 
where k is the threshold parameter k =T/j, and T is a range of acceptable values. If the price 
(value of ensemble q) is too high or too low, then the set of linked propositions and their 
collective value can be readjusted through a feedback mechanism (Yj). 
 
Section 2: modified cryptographic hash 
Our modified cryptographic hash can be defined as a cypher which encodes an 
encountered numeric value and maps it to a string encoded in the agent's genome. For example, a 
numeric value (e.g. 545) is converted to an alphabetical string (e.g. xyy). The encoded string is 
then mapped to a longer (endogenous) alphabetical string in the agent's genomic representation 
(e.g. xxyyzz). A match in the correct order serves as a key that the presented value is within the 
range of acceptable values for that individual.  
 
As the endogenous alphabetic string is part of a genotypic representation, mutations 
(induced either randomly or deterministically) may be allowed to occur. This allows for the 
possible range of acceptable values to change. This frame-shifting property may also allow for 
the shorter (converted) string to be culture-specific [24], or for structured variation to be 
exhibited across the population.  
 
Section 3: modified CGS details 
 The tuning parameter (α) can be split into n factors, where n is the number of dimensions 
extending away from the direction of the scaling expansion. In Figure 4, there are two tuning 
factors: αAx and αBx. Due to the nature of the soft classifier, which is classifies incoming stimuli 
relative to previously-observed stimuli, an extension of the model is necessary for dealing with 
unusual and rare events. The factors of parameter α are adjusted on the basis of the genomic 
representation for mental flexibility and the initial definition of dimensions and anchors.  
 
 The inset in Figure 4 shows that the rescaling is not to the new stimuli themselves, but 
acts to expand the classifier to approximate its suitable location in conceptual space. There is a 
degree of geometric constraint to the new boundaries of this space which allows the kernel to 
expand beyond the scope of the new stimuli. Rather than expanding to a leading edge of newly-
encountered stimuli, the new stimuli are instead framed in a new context. 
 
Section 4: imitation as decision-making heuristic 
 In cases where objects are not well-known or defined, simple imitative behaviors can be 
used as a decision-making heuristic. Imitation is done by making a copy of the endogenous 
alphabetic string described in Section 2. This is a cheap adaptation in the sense that 
modifications to the CGS kernel are not required. In this sense, imitation overrides cognitive 
classification and resembles an emotional response. However, imitation is also imprecise in that 
such decisions do not take advantage of generative context or reasoning mechanisms.  
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Section 5: Observation (selection) criteria 
 Acquisition of new propositions (including linked propositions) in the pairwise model is 
determined by the observation criterion. The observation criterion for agent x is based in part on 
the existing share of singleton and linked propositions for agent x. Agent x also incorporates the 
behavior and proposition accumulation of first-order neighbors (e.g. agent y). The criterion (or 
decision-making heuristic) c defines the minimal utility of acquiring new propositions. This can 
be defined mathematically as 
 
       
  
  
 
  
  
   
  
  
     
   
  
    
[2] 
 
where Kx/Kn is a pairwise comparison between agent x (Kx) and its first-order neighbors (1, 
2,.....n) including agent y, Sm is the symbolic premium, and Sc is the scarcity premium. As a 
departure from conventional models of utility maximization, the c parameter includes premiums 
for symbolic considerations that are treated on par with the scarcity premium. As such, both the 
symbolic and scarcity premiums are sampled through observations of the local interaction 
network. 
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